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　Ⅰ　Introduction
　In 2012, San Francisco-based brand acquisi-
tion and marketing start-up Fantex Inc. （“Fan-
tex”） pioneered a financial solution that allowed 
professional athletes to sell a percentage of 
their future earnings in exchange for an upfront 
lump-sum payment, an arrangement commonly 
referred to as an income sharing agreement 
（“ISA”） （Oei and Ring 2014, 2015; Medeiros 
2017). Fantex re-packaged and marketed the 
arrangement to investors as an opportunity 
to participate in the earnings potential – both 
on and off-field – of these professional athletes. 
It was a win-win proposition: Athletes would 
immediately realize a portion of their potential 
earnings and brand income, investors would 
gain access to a new speculative asset class 
that could provide high returns and diversifica-
tion benefits, while sports fans could invest in 
the continued success of their favorite players, 
drawing them even closer into the action. From 
the athlete`s perspective, the lump-sum payment 
from the ISA provided for both the financial 
bandwidth to pursue current opportunities in 
higher yielding investments and the transfer of 
part of their financial risk in the event of injury 
or failure to secure their next contract. Howev-
er, the devil is in the details as they say. This 
paper will discuss the key risks and benefits of 
Fantex’ s professional athlete tracking shares 
and how this financial innovation differed from 
other attempts at securitizing athletes and their 
earnings potential. 
　Although the Fantex series of athlete con-
vertible tracking stocks was the first of its kind, 
this was hardly the first time the sports indus-
try attempted to securitize or monetize athletes 
as intangible assets. In 1999, English Premier 
League team Leeds United, a team on the cusp 
of league dominance, entered into various “sale-
and-leaseback” arrangements with their bank-
ing partner to finance the acquisition of expen-
sive new talent to take their team to the next 
level. The scheme allowed the team to “lease” 
the players by securing the transfer fee loan 
against the player's contract and to service the 
debt over the contract period. If the player lost 
value in the transfer market, the lender （bank） 
could claim the difference from the football club 
or in the event of the football club's default, 
from a credit-enhancing insurance wrapper pur-
chased against the club as part of the “sale-and-
leaseback” financing structure （Cathcart, 2004). 
This approach spread out the strain from in-
terest payments on the club and the newfound 
financial flexibility spurred club management 
towards issuing increasing amounts of debt, in-
cluding securitized loans, to acquire even more 
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apart in 2002 when Leeds United started to fall 
in league rankings and the club's growing finan-
cial obligations forced them to release players in 
a dampened transfer market resulting in size-
able losses. By 2004, still struggling under their 
debt burden, Leeds United's fall from grace was 
complete and they were relegated from the 
Premier League following a bottom-three finish 
（Brinksworth, 2004; Burns, 2006). 
　In considering income sharing agreements 
from a broader perspective to include debt se-
curities backed by an athlete's playing contract, 
the turn of the century also saw individual ath-
letes begin to explore securitization options in 
the financial markets as a means to monetize 
their earnings potential or increase their control 
over their financial situation.  Frank Thomas, 
a former slugger with the Chicago White Sox, 
planned a debt issuance in the late-90s, seeking 
to realize the deferred compensation aspects 
of his playing contract in Major League Base-
ball. However, investor concerns over various 
contractual clauses in his playing contract de-
railed the negotiations and the deal fell through 
（Fried, DeSchriver and Mondello, 2013). In 2008, 
Randy Newsom, a minor league baseball player, 
tried to raise USD50,000 by selling 2,500 shares 
in himself at USD20 per share through his web-
site, Real Sports Investments. The intent was to 
finance Newsom to the major leagues through 
such income sharing agreements. If he was 
signed to a major league team, the shareholder 
would be entitled to 0.002% of his pay. How-
ever, he withdrew the securities after a year 
fearing that he was in violation of the securities 
laws and the rules of Major League Baseball 
（Schwartz, 2015). These cases illustrate not only 
the interest from professional athletes in the 
possibilities of ISAs but highlights the complex 
contractual and regulatory hurdles that they 
face in bringing this idea to fruition. One suc-
cessful example was NFL Running Back William 
Andrews of the Atlanta Falcons whose contract 
included an annuity that paid out a guaranteed 
USD8 million spread over the 40 years follow-
ing his retirement in 1986. In 2001, Andrews 
negotiated a private placement offering with 
Hanleigh Co. to receive USD2 million upfront in 
exchange for the remaining stream of cashflows 
which amounted to USD5 million over 25 years 
（Brown, Rascher, Nagel, and McEvoy, 2016). 
This deal was likely successful as the agreement 
bore significantly less risk and uncertainty giv-
en the risk of default on annuity payments lay 
with the Atlanta Falcons rather than Andrews. 
　Closer in spirit to Fantex is OneSeason, a 
virtual sports trading platform, where shares 
on professional athletes IPO at USD5 per share. 
The shares would trade on OneSeason's ex-
change, with price changes reflecting on-field 
performance and market demand but the se-
curities were not directly linked to the income 
of the players. OneSeason successfully raised 
USD3.5 million in Series A funding in 2009 and 
the site opened to strong early demand. How-
ever, “investors” soon realized that without 
any direct claim on athlete earnings, the shares 
lacked any real intrinsic value. OneSeason's ath-
lete stock market peaked at USD300,000 and it 
was eventually forced to close as its business 
model proved unsustainable （Schwartz, 2015).
　Ⅱ　Intangible Assets
　Do professional athletes qualify as assets to be 
“owned” and accounted for by their respective 
sports franchises? This question was the source 
of much debate in the European soccer leagues. 
In 1989, the Tottenham Hotspurs adopted an 
accounting policy to record player registration 
costs on the balance sheet thus treating a player 
as an intangible asset as opposed to an expense 
（Morrow, 1999). The players' transfer fees re-
flected their value on the balance sheets of pub-
licly traded football clubs（Foster, Greyser, and 
Walsh, 2006）. Traditionally, the earning power 
of the individual is not tradeable, and this was 
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said to be the key difference between invest-
ment in humans and investment in property. 
The transfer market is a challenge to this notion 
of assets （Morrow, 1999). 
　In December 1997, FRS 10 on Goodwill and 
Intangible assets was introduced by the Ac-
counting Standards Board （ASB). Under FRS 
10, all intangible assets can be amortized over 
their useful economic lives, including intangi-
bles obtained through arms-length transactions. 
Conceivably, football players would fall into 
this category for their respective football clubs. 
One question that remains to be addressed is 
whether these assets generate economic ben-
efits. Amir and Livine （2005） show that the 
transfer of players yields economic benefits for 
the team in terms of increased sales or profits 
as evidenced in a regression of profits or sales 
on transfer fees paid （investment） and fees 
received. They also find that transfer fees paid 
are positively related to market values, provid-
ing evidence that market participants agree 
with treatment prescribed by the new account-
ing requirement. However, there is “little doubt 
that the far-reaching implications of FRS 10 for 
football clubs was not a specific intention of the 
ASB” （Morrow, 1999 p.127). Furthermore, FRS 
10 does not recognize the market value of home-
grown players as internally developed intangi-
ble assets, thereby differentiating the treatment 
of transferred players and homegrown players 
on the balance sheet. 
　As Oei and Ring （2015） point out, the absence 
of regulation over young players could lead to 
ethical issues of “exploitation, discontinuation of 
schooling, provision of performance enhancing 
drugs, age misrepresentation, and overcrowded 
and substandard training facilities” （Oei and 
Ring, 2015 p.701). For example, “local street 
agents” known as buscones actively develop 
Caribbean-born baseball players from youth un-
til they are eligible to sign with an MLB team. 
In return, the buscones demand a substantial 
percentage of the signing bonus if the player 
contracts with an MLB team. Such an arrange-
ment would fall under the umbrella of Income 
Sharing Agreements （“ISA”） as it involves the 
sale of an income generating asset or rights on 
future income. This raises an important ethical 
question if such ISAs constitute ownership over 
human capital resembling servitude. In the con-
text of Fantex, their iteration of an ISA would 
raise concerns over the sense of “human own-
ership” if the base for income sharing covered a 
broad or wide range of income activities and ac-
counted for a substantial fraction of the income 
base （Oei and Ring, 2015).
　Ⅲ　 Fantex Income Sharing Agreement 
and Tracking Stocks
　The first of the Fantex series of athlete track-
ing stocks dates back to February 2014 when 
Fantex held IPO roadshows across eleven des-
tinations around the United States to market 
their Vernon Davis Fantex series stock. Accord-
ing to the prospectus filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission （“SEC”), Fantex 
entered into a Brand Contract Agreement 
（“Brand Contract”） with the athlete, agreeing 
to provide a lump-sum payment upfront for a 
fixed percentage of the athlete's future brand 
income in perpetuity. This referred to all in-
come related to or derived from his professional 
skill and brand, including his contract salary 
and performance incentives, any endorsement 
deals or paid appearances, and revenues from a 
post-playing career if related to his field of ex-
pertise such as sports broadcasting or coaching. 
In effect, the Brand Contract is an income shar-
ing agreement between Fantex and the athlete. 
Fantex would also own co-investment rights if 
the athlete were presented an investment op-
portunity that leveraged his brand. To finance 
the lump-sum payment of the Brand Contract, 
Fantex raises an equity offering of convertible 
tracking stocks linked to the performance of the 
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Brand Contract. However, the tracking stock 
represents no claim or ownership interest in the 
Brand Contract and only represents a share in 
the platform common stock of the management 
company, Fantex Inc. （SEC S-1, 2013). 
　A closer look at the attribution of income 
derived from the Brand Contract to Fantex 
tracking stock shareholders reveals that 95% of 
Brand Contract Income and a share of the gen-
eral liabilities and expenses of Fantex forms the 
value attributable to the tracking stock. Inves-
tors are therefore taking a position not only on 
the earnings potential of the athlete but on the 
aggregate performance of Fantex as a company 
and its ability to manage its expenses. Addition-
ally, several structural features of the tracking 
stocks imply that investors should maintain a 
high degree of trust in the “good faith” efforts 
of management in conducting their business. 
One example is the convertible feature which 
permits Fantex to convert any Fantex Series 
Tracking Stock to common platform stock at 
their sole discretion. This could occur during a 
corporate restructuring or if a Brand Contract 
is presumed to no longer be generating any 
brand income due to a career ending injury or 
an athlete not fulfilling his potential and getting 
cut from the team but is in no way limited to 
these situations. 
　The dividend payout policy is the primary 
mechanism for investors to earn a return on 
their investment given the likelihood of low 
trading volumes and a lack of liquidity for such 
shares, and states that periodic dividends de-
clared will be in excess of 20% of the “available 
dividend amount,” which refers to attributable 
income less expenses. However, management 
reserves the right not only to adjust dividend 
payments but to retain available funds for gen-
eral operations and development of Fantex （SEC 
S-1, 2013). The lack of separation between the 
income and expenses of the securitized asset 
and the general operations of the firm could 
mean that early investors bear a proportionally 
greater share of the financial burden of Fantex's 
operations compared to later series of shares 
and without any clear form of compensation for 
the additional risk. Dividends for the Vernon 
Davis series are summarized in Table 1.
　Beyond a fixed percentage claim on the 
Brand Income of the athlete, the Brand Contract 
gives Fantex the right of direct co-investment 
in certain investment opportunities presented 
to the athlete up to the percentage of Brand In-
come acquired. In the case of Vernon Davis, this 
allowed Fantex to take a direct equity stake 
（10%） in three Jamba Juice Franchise licenses 
acquired by Vernon Davis in 2015 as part of an 
expanded endorsement deal （Fantex, 2015b） 
and was financed using attributable income to 
the Vernon Davis series. Co-investment enables 
Fantex to build up a portfolio of assets based 
on the investment opportunities afforded to its 
athletes that may reliably generate cash flow 
during a player's post-career phase. However, 
drawing down from available dividend amounts 
to finance such investments exposes the inves-
tors to potential loss or increased volatility and 
investors are fully reliant on Fantex manage-
ment to possess the relevant expertise in assess-
ing potential opportunities. 
　Fantex athlete equity were not limited to 
tracking the brand income of individual athletes. 
In 2016 Fantex launched a private placement 
for Fantex Sports Portfolio Unit 1 （code FXSP I） 
which bundled the 20 Brand Contracts listed in 
Table 2 and shuttered their brokerage service 
platform. Fantex sold 5,933,765 units at USD10 
each and has consistently paid dividends to its 
investors.
　To estimate the fair value for each Brand
Year 2016 2017 2018 2019
Dividend Amount $1.5 $1.27 $0.89 $0.85
Source: Fantex Inc. website and SEC 10-K Reports.
Table １　Dividend per unit for Vernon Davis Series 
Stock
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 Contract, Fantex undertakes extensive statis-
tical analysis using historical performance data 
for comparable athletes. In assessing the value 
of a player, a wide array of data on on-field
statistics such as strike outs per inning are col-
lated, analyzed and correlated to future brand 
income （SEC 10-K, 2015). Assuming a 14-year 
career, Fantex estimated a present value of 
Vernon Davis' lifetime brand income at approx-
imately USD40 million, of which Fantex is enti-
tled to 10% under the Brand Contract （SEC S-1, 
2013). Fantex varies the use of discount rates 
depending on the assessed risk and uncertainty 
of the future cash flows. This illustrates how the 
application of Sabermetrics in baseball or more 
generally sports analytics can go beyond that 
of building a winning roster and developing on-
field tactics （Maxcy and Drayer, 2014). 
　The Fantex Series of Athlete Convertible 
Tracking Stocks are highly speculative and 
shifts a portion of the financial risk from the ath-
lete to the investor. The athlete is paid upfront 
for a fraction of his unrealized future earnings, 
thereby transferring the risk of failing to realize 
his potential earnings to the investor. The inves-
tors take on that risk with no recourse to any 
assets or control over the athlete's actions. The 
upside potential of these securities is limited to 
the athlete outperforming the Brand Contract 
valuation, whereas the downside is a complete 
loss of principal less any distributed dividends. 





Vernon Davis NFL Tight End Oct. 30, 2013 10% $4.00 421,000
EJ Manuel NFL Quarterback Feb. 14, 2014 10% $4.98 523,700
Mohamed Sanu NFL W. Receiver May 14 2014 10% $1.56 164,300
Alshon Jeffery NFL W. Receiver Sept. 7, 2014 13% $7.94 835,800
Michael Brockers NFL Def, Tackle Oct. 15, 2014 10% $3.44 362,200
Jack Mewhort NFL Off. Tackle Feb. 15, 2015 10% $2.52 268,100
Kendall Wright NFL W. Receiver Dec. 1, 2014 10% $3.13
Andrew Heaney MLB Pitcher Jan. 1, 2015 10% $3.34
Terrance Williams NFL W. Receiver Feb. 1, 2015 10% $3.06
Ryan Shazier NFL Linebacker Sept. 1, 2015 10% $3.11
Scott Langley PGA Oct. 25, 2015 15% $3.06
Collin McHugh MLB Pitcher Apr. 1, 2016 10% $3.96
Tyler Duffey MLB Pitcher Feb. 1, 2016 10% $2,23
Jonathan Schoop MLB Second Jan. 1, 2016 10% $4.91
Yangervis Solarte MLB Third Apr. 1, 2016 11% $3.15
Maikel Franco MLB Third Apr. 1, 2016 10% $4.35
Allen Robinson NFL W. Receiver Feb. 15, 2016 12% $4.60
Kelly Kraft PGA Mar. 1, 2016 15% $2.28
Jack Maguire PGA Mar. 1, 2016 11% $2.07
Source: Data compiled from SEC 10-K and 10-Q Reports.
Table 2　Summary of Fantex Athlete Brand Contracts 
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Ⅳ　Asymmetric Information and Fantex
　
　Tennis star Lleyton Hewitt was quoted as 
saying he was always one injury away from 
hanging up his racket. No athlete is immune 
from injury and they should have a strong in-
centive to maintain a form of insurance to miti-
gate the financial impact of such an event. Given 
that Fantex pays its athletes an upfront, lump-
sum payment under the terms of the Brand 
Contract, it may be comparable to an economic 
contract that is fully paid out upfront, with 
the percentage of income to be paid to Fantex 
acting as the premium. Moreover, as a perpet-
ual contract, Fantex does not require principal 
repayment from the contracted athlete and the 
arrangement could be understood in the context 
of an economic contract which resembles insur-
ance （Medeiros, 2017). Consequently, as with 
insurance contracts, the issues of information 
asymmetry and moral hazard are unavoidable. 
A recent study by Madonia and Smith （2016） 
provides empirical evidence that poker players 
under a short-term income sharing agreement 
perform substantially worse than players not 
participating in an ISA. This suggests that a dis-
incentive to perform due to income sharing type 
agreements is an ever-present risk that should 
be mitigated in the structure of the （Brand） 
Contract.
　Information asymmetry occurs when sellers 
（athletes） have information that buyers （Fantex 
or investors） do not have about some aspect of 
product quality （potential playing ability). In 
NFL Running Back Arian Foster's Brand Con-
tract, Fantex proposed to pay USD10 million 
for 20% of his future earnings. In comparison, 
NFL Tight End Vernon Davis was only willing 
to part with 10% of his potential brand income 
for USD4 million. In Arian Foster's case, while 
his injury history is disclosed in the prospectus, 
we may not understand the full extent that it 
has on his playing ability, both physical and 
psychological. Arian Foster would be in the 
best position to know his physical condition 
and the toll the game takes on his body and 
his mind. If he considered the Fantex valua-
tion of his income to be higher than or equal 
to his own projections, then he would likely 
be more willing to part with a higher percent-
age. This is the case of hidden information or 
what is often referred to as adverse selection. 
　On the other hand, athletes could change 
their behavior after contracting with Fantex 
leading to another asymmetric information 
problem known as moral hazard. The moral 
hazard aspect that could affect the economic 
contract （brand contract） is when the insured 
（the signed athlete） takes more risks as the 
insurance provides downside protection and 
they have less incentive to avoid such behavior 
（Oei and Ring, 2015). Assuming athletes want 
to perform better and increase their future 
salaries, the brand contract aligns the athlete 
with Fantex and the investors. However, upon 
receiving the payment upfront, the athlete “may 
train less dutifully, leading to declining perfor-
mance and less future compensation for himself 
and his investors” （Schwartz, 2015 p.1143). Ac-
cording to the 2014 Annual Report for Fantex, 
Vernon Davis did not attend off-season condi-
tioning training sessions （forgoing USD200,000 
in workout bonuses） and staged a holdout for 
higher pay which ultimately came to naught 
and incurred a further USD70,000 in fines for 
missing a mandatory minicamp. This translates 
to USD27,000 less in attributable income under 
the Brand Contract. Following their agreement 
with Fantex, athletes may not pursue the high-
est or even higher paying contracts due to life-
style preferences giving rise to another form of 
moral hazard. Medeiros （2017） notes the case 
of Alan LaRoche of the White Sox who retired 
early and forfeited the remainder of his contract 
payment since management failed to accommo-
date his request to have his son be present on a 
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regular basis in the clubhouse. While this cannot 
be construed as a change in behavior it does 
illustrate the wide array of choices that athletes 
have when pursuing their career in sport, not 
all of which are consistent with maximizing 
the return for the investor. Although there is a 
claw-back clause within the first two years if an 
athlete chooses to retire for reasons other than 
major injury, considering projections tend to be 
in the high-single to double digit range in years 
with respect to career longevity, valuations 
would be heavily impacted by the shortening of 
an athlete's career.
　There are inherent risks in expecting the 
contracting parties to operate in good faith es-
pecially considering the unsecured nature of the 
obligations. Another form of moral hazard could 
arise when an athlete may willfully neglect to 
disclose a new brand income opportunity or 
simply refuse to pay and default on their con-
tractual obligations. NFL wide receiver Kendall 
Wright signed a Brand Contract with Fantex 
for 10% of his future brand income on 26 March 
2015 in exchange for an upfront payment of 
USD3.125 million. After making initial payments 
in 2017, Kendall Wright failed to make good 
on subsequent payment obligations despite re-
peated reminders and communication between 
Fantex and his representatives. Fantex pursued 
legal action in 2018 in San Francisco, California 
and a district judge ordered Kendall Wright to 
pay USD386,000 （including legal fees） to fulfill 
the terms of the contract （Fantex, Inc. v. Kend-
all Wright, 2018). Although this was resolved in 
Fantex's favor, this case served to highlight the 
operational challenges in such agreements but 
also raises questions on the absence of an early 
termination or buyout clause for a contract that 
extends into perpetuity.
　Nicole Medeiros （2017） proposes an earnout 
provision allowing athletes to earn a portion of 
the Brand Contract payment based on achiev-
ing various performance goals or earning levels 
to address the issue of asymmetric information. 
This reduces the risk to investors from moral 
hazard risks as payments are broken up into 
earned installments. Another option could be a 
buyout clause which allows the athlete to repur-
chase his brand contract at a specified price or 
return to investors, which may give the athletes 
who outperform their brand contract the oppor-
tunity to repurchase their brand contract from 
Fantex, while providing investors with an ade-
quate return. 
　Ⅴ　 DREAM Fan Shares, SD26 LLC & 
Tokenization 
　In the most recent attempt to securitize and 
market the earnings potential of professional 
athletes, current NBA player Spencer Dinwid-
die is resurrecting the concept of an investment 
and trading platform for securities originated 
and backed by athletes and entertainers, start-
ing with himself. In 2019, Dinwiddie established 
DREAM Fan Shares （“DFS”） – an Ethere-
um-based investment platform – to launch the 
first tokenized hybrid debt security backed by 
the cashflows from Dinwiddie's NBA playing 
contract, named “$SD8”. The original $SD8 
structure was a 3-year debt instrument which 
paid fixed interest over the first 2 years and re-
paid principal in addition to a “revenue-sharing” 
bonus in year 3 equivalent to 40% of Dinwid-
die's 2021-22 post-tax basketball related income 
（“BRI”） （Arnovitz, 2019). Dinwiddie owned a 
player option for USD12.3 million in 2021-22, and 
if his on-court success led to a more lucrative 
contract, investors would share in the upside. 
Barring a default and assuming post-tax BRI is 
around 50% of declared salary, investors would 
stand to earn an expected annual return be-
tween 7.4% （player option exercised） and 15.1% 
（max contract awarded） over the life of the 
note. 
　The total issuance was planned for up 
to USD13.5 million （90 Digital Tokens at 
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USD150,000 each） and made available only to 
accredited investors under Regulation D of 
the SEC. The maximum issue size represented 
only 40% of Dinwiddie's NBA Contract Salary 
（USD34 million） over the same period ensuring 
adequate cash flow, in addition to credit-en-
hancement features including placing USD3 
million of reserves in Cash, Gold and Bitcoin on 
a public blockchain ledger until the maturity 
of the note （Charania, 2019). While default risk 
could be mitigated with reserves, moral hazard 
could be an issue since Dinwiddie may opt to 
contract with another team for a lower contract 
price due to personal or other reasons.
　Ultimately, the NBA League Office rejected 
Dinwiddie's proposal after several discussions, 
considering the structure a violation of Article 
II Section 13（d） of the 2017 NBA Collective 
Bargaining Agreement （“CBA”） which states 
“…No player shall assign or otherwise transfer 
to any third party his right to receive Compen-
sation from the Team under his Uniform Player 
Contract…” and were concerned the participat-
ing bonus optionality contravened anti-gambling 
regulations （NBA-NBPA CBA, 2017 p59-60). 
Dinwiddie is presently working with the NBA 
to modify his offering （renamed “$SD26” follow-
ing the change in his jersey number） and will 
likely be issued as a straight 3-year bond with 
4.95% interest and principal repayment at matu-
rity （Sprung, 2020), although details on the final-
ized structure are undisclosed at this moment. 
　With a security backed by an athlete's play-
ing contract, there are risks that extend beyond 
those of traditional debt or equity investments. 
Liquidity will be scarce given the small issue 
size and a viable secondary market may fail to 
materialize, forcing investors to hold the secu-
rity to maturity. Moral hazard in the extreme 
case involving behavioral risk of the player 
which leads to early termination of the playing 
contract, might include substance abuse, illegal 
activities leading to dismissal from the team, 
etc. Another aspect that is rarely invoked but 
has become of special relevance now involves 
reduction of player salaries under a Force Ma-
jeure Event, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Under the NBA's CBA Article XXXIX, Section 
5, Players could lose 1/92.6th of their salary 
for every game missed as a result of a Force 
Majeure Event, which includes war and ter-
rorism, natural disasters and epidemics （NBA-
NBPA CBA, 2017 p.468). On 11 March 2020, 
the NBA suspended the remainder of the 2019-
20 NBA Season due to the escalating spread of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. While the NBA has 
confirmed that full salaries will be paid up to 1 
April 2020, the League Office may invoke the 
Force Majeure clause and cut salaries starting 
15 April 2020 to recover lost income from the 
cancelled games （Cancian, 2020). Depending on 
how long the social distancing measures remain 
in place, players and the league stand to lose 
significant amounts of basketball related income. 
　Ⅵ　Conclusion
　The sports motif can bring excitement to the 
classroom and help stir student interest in finan-
cial and economic theory （Mahar and Paul, 2010; 
Butler, Butler, and Considine, 2016). This re-
search note should provide instructors of sports 
business, intermediate finance, and intermediate 
microeconomics with information to provide a 
real-life example in class involving issues related 
to asymmetric information and income sharing 
type agreements. The Fantex Series Tracking 
Stocks on professional athletes may not have 
gained widespread investor acceptance and the 
financial structure of the agreement could be 
strengthened to favor the investor and protect 
against the issues of moral hazard and informa-
tion asymmetry. However, securities based on 
income sharing agreements represent an op-
portunity for professional athletes to capitalize 
on their current performance and popularity 
to monetize their future income and protect 
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themselves against downside risks. The issues 
of trading liquidity, credible management and 
the performance tracking error of the securities 
will likely need to be addressed to further ex-
pand investor appeal. On the other hand, these 
income sharing agreements mark another mile-
stone in the financial innovations created for the 
entertainment and sports industry to continue 
pushing the boundaries of finance.
Appendix
　The appendix summarizes examples of fi-
nancial modeling that can easily be introduced 
and incorporated into a lecture as “real world” 
applications: Vernon Davis series stock price 
volatility, Fantex stock options, and valuation of 
the securities proposed by Dinwiddie. 
Example 1: Volatility
　Fantex athlete stocks were traded on the FBS 
alternative trading system （ATS） through 2015. 
The observed stock prices could provide us 
with information on the investors perception of 
the riskiness of the cash flows （brand income） 
generated by the athlete including the impact of 
a potential injury. We apply the high-low volatili-
ty estimates, developed in Parkinson （1980） and 
discussed in Garman and Klass （1980） where 
q denotes the intervals on an annual basis and 
N refers to the number of quarters in the data 
series. H and L are the high and low stock price 
for each observed quarter.
　Thin and non-synchronous trading of the 
Fantex stock pose a problem in estimation as 
the true high price higher than the observed 
high price and true low price lower than the 
observed low price, so the current estimate is a 
lower bound within this context. The SEC files 
provide us with seven high and low quarterly 
prices for the Fantex Vernon Davis series stock 
in 2014 and 2015. This gives us q=4 （quarterly） 
and N=7 and a Vernon Davis price volatility es-
timate of approximately 124% （annual basis). 
Example 2: Executive Stock Option
　In practice, the Black Scholes model is often 
used to value the executive stock for accounting 
purposes. Data for executive stock options for 
the Chief Legal Officer is outlined in detail in the 
SEC 10-K documents. The underlying volatility 
is given as 0.655, the risk-free rate is 0.0175, and 
the strike price at 1.61 for options maturing July 
2023. Assuming a vesting period of 1.5 years, we 
will set the time to maturity to 6 years. One can 
confirm the reported value of 0.967 reported in 
the 10-K by a straightforward application of the 
Black Scholes formula. 
Example 3: Proposed $SD8 / $SD26 Structure 
（Spencer Dinwiddie）
　Given the information provided in the popular 
press, the original Dinwiddie security proposed 
in 2019 could be valued as 
　where V= max （USD12.3 million , New salary） 
is the value of the bonus earned in three years 
based on his player option which provides for 
an effective floor of USD12.3 million. y is the 
yield （monthly basis） for the bond with a ma-
turity in T months. The proposed maturity of 
the contract is 3 years or T=36 months and the 
proposed coupon rate was 2.5% p.a. We assume 
Dinwiddie will not opt out of his player option to 
sign a contract of lower value than USD12.3 mil-
lion （e.g. to allow team to sign other free agents 
with the excess salary cap space). The above is 
on a pre-tax basis. 
　The bond price as outlined in the revised pro-
posal in early 2020 would be the equivalent of a 
straight bond paying 4.95% p.a. monthly with a 
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